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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA G. SMITH (TAYLOR,)
Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

vs.

:

SCOTT G. SMITH.

: Case No. 890025-CA

Defendant-Appellant-

: Category 7

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this domestic
relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (g) (Supp.
1989) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
Did the trial court err in granting plaintiff-respondentfs

I.
motion

in limine, which motion precluded

defendant-appellant

from

introducing evidence at the hearing regarding plaintiff-respondent's
contempt from the time the parties were divorced on April 13, 1981 until
plaintiff-respondent was found in contempt of Court for her failure to
allow visitation to defendant-appellant, which order was entered by the
Court on December 14, 1984?
II.
of

Did the trial court err in failing to find a material change

circumstances

when

it

only

considered

plaintiff-respondentfs

contemptuous behavior since December 14, 1984 and not since the decree
n-e riwnrne which was entered on April 13, 1981?

III. Did

the

trial

court

err

in

failing

to

find

that

plaintiff-respondent's interference with defendant's visitation rights
constituted a substantial and material change in circumstances which
supports a change of custody?

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-10(1) and (2) (1988), and Rule 52 Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (1988) are the applicable statutes in this
natter, copies of which are included at Appendix "A".

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OP THE CASE AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

This is an appeal from an Order of the Fourth Judicial District
:ourtf

in which the Honorable Ray M. Harding ruled that defendant-

Lppellant's (Scott Smith) Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce be
lismissed in that there was not a showing of a material change of
•ircumstances to warrant a change in custody of the parties' minor child
Jesse) from plaintiff-respondent (Patricia Taylor), to Scott Smith.
Scott Smith appeals from this ruling stating that the true nature
f the circumstances was never presented to the court in connection with
petition to modify custody due to the Court granting a Motion in
imine excluding prior evidence of visitation violations.
B.

COURSE OP THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELEVANT FACTS.

On April 13, 1981 the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, of the Fourth
udicial District Court of Utah County, entered a Decree of Divorce to
^ie captioned parties.

Scott Smith was not present at the hearing but
2

had filed a Consent and Waiver for Entry of Judgment with the Court.
At the hearing Patricia Taylor was granted the custody of the parties1
minor child, Jesse, and Scott was granted reasonable visitation.

(R.

12-16) .
On August 14, 1981 the Honorable Maurice Harding of the Fourth
Judicial District Court held a hearing on Scott's Motion for Order to
Show Cause filed July 20, 1981, (R. 19) and entered an Order Modifying
Decree (R. 27-28) which specifically defined Scott's visitation.
Following the August 14, 1981 Order to Show Cause Hearing Patricia
Taylor and Jesse moved to Mexico, (R. 506-7) , and later to the State of
Arizona, (R. 507-8), both moves seriously frustrating Scott's visitation
rights.
rights

Scott sought the aid of the Court in enforcing his visitation
through

another

Order

to

Show

Cause

Hearing,

subsequently heard on August 17, 1982 before Judge Bullock.

which

was

Scott was

ordered to pay child support to the Court because of the difficulty of
locating Patricia.
Scott

(R. 79-80).

continued

to

have

difficulty

with

his

visitation

and

petitioned the Court for an Order to Show Cause hearing on August 13,
1984.

Scott questioned why Patricia should not be held in contempt for

her failure to allow Scott visitation after she moved to Mexico and then
relocated herself and Jesse to the State of Arizona without notifying
Scott of Jesse's whereabouts.

(R. 89-91).

The hearing held before

Judge Bullock on October 3, 1984 was continued to a later date.

(R.98-

100) .
On December 11, 1984, both parties appeared before Judge Bullock
3

md an Order Modifying Decree was entered on December 14, 1984. In the
>rder Scott's visitation was set forth in greater detail and Patricia
r

as found to be in contempt of Court for her deliberate denial of

cott's visitation rights.

(R. 158-65).

On June 21, 1988, Scott filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of
ivorce based on Patricia Taylor's continued attempts to thwart his
isitation with his son. Scott represents that such actions constitute
material change of circumstances which justifies awarding a change of
ustody of Jesse.

(R. 294-98).

On July 27, 1988, Patricia, through her counsel in Texas, filed a
otion to Stay Proceedings arguing that custody should be determined in
exas.

(R.

3 06-13).

Judge Harding entered a Memorandum Decision

enying the Motion to Stay
urisdiction of the matter.

Proceedings

in that Utah will

retain

(R. 359-60).

On December 9, 1988, Patricia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
R. 402-3) which was later denied due to issues of material fact which
seded to be presented to the Court.

(R. 405).

On December 13, 1988, prior to the trial, an informal conference
as held in the chambers of Judge Harding where the Court considered
itricia Taylor's motion

in limine to restrict

scember 14, 1984. The motion in limine was granted.

evidence prior to
Due to the motion

i limine Scott was unable to present evidence to support his petition
)r custody.

Scott's petition was dismissed, and Patricia was still

)und to be in Contempt of Court.

(R. 405-6).

On April 28, 1989, Scott Smith filed his Notice of Appeal from the
4

decision rendered by Judge Harding.

(R. 444).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Due to the fact that the original divorce decree was entered by
default the issue of custody was not fully examined by the court.

The

best interests of the child were not litigated.
The first time the issue of custody was brought before the Court
was June 21, 1988. Scott Smith argued that his former wife's persistent
and malicious interference with his visitation rights constituted a
material change in circumstances warranting a change in custody.

The

bulk of Scott's evidence was excluded because the Court determined that
the evidence had already been heard.
although

the

evidence

had

been

In so ruling the court erred;

heard

in

regards

to

contempt

proceedings, it has never been presented in relation to the issue of
custody.
The

Court

further

erred

in

holding

that

interference

visitation was not a material change of circumstance.

with

Had the Court

heard all the relevant evidence it could only have concluded that the
best interests of Jesse Smith would not be served by Patricia Taylor.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
REVIEW THE ENTIRE RECORD
A,

The Change-In-Circumstances Inquiry Is Less Restricted In Non-

diudicated Custody Awards.
When Scott Smith petitioned the Court to Modify the Divorce Decree
i June 21, 1988, it was his first attempt in seeking the physical care,
Dntrol and custody of Jesse,

Since the initial decree of divorce in

Dril 1981, all modifications to the final order of the court were for
le purpose of more specifically detailing Scott's visitation rights.
:ott has attempted, but has not been afforded, the opportunity of
resenting to the Court his reasons for pursuing custody and having the
mrt determine that he is a fit and proper parent to be awarded custody
: his son Jesse.
Custody modification is an area in which a petitioning party has
high threshold to overcome before the courts will consider changing
i original decree.

In establishing this threshold of stability, the

>urts have relied upon a two-pronged test for modification of custody,
tlined in Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982) . As a means of creating
nsistency in custody disputes, the test requires a finding of material
ange in circumstances from which the initial custody was based before
e order is opened to determine the best interests of the child.
6

Maughan v. Maughan, 102 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989) has
emphasized the importance of this test: "If the initial award was based
on a thorough examination by the trial court of the various factors
pertaining to the child's welfare, a rigid application of the changein-circumstances prong is in order."

In the case before the court the

initial custody award of Jesse Smith was not based on a thorough
examination

of

factors pertaining

to the child's best interests.

Accordingly, a less rigid application of the change-in circumstances
test is appropriate.
Scott

realizes

the

importance

of

the

change-in-circumstances

standard and he attempted to set forth evidence which supported his
claim of a material change, but was hindered by the Court's granting of
a motion in limine.

The issue Scott now raises is one which Supreme

Court Justices Stewart and Howe referred to in their concurring opinions
in Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P. 2d 624 (Utah 1987).

In that case the Justices

cautioned

"change-in-circumstance"

a

rigid

application

of

the

requirement while agreeing with the need for the standard established
in Hogge.

Justice Stewart acknowledged the requirements of Hogge as a

means to prevent repetitive custody disputes and to aid in fostering
family stability. He further recognized that in some instances a strict
application of the requirements in favor of stability could ultimately
be more detrimental to the interests of the child then the effects of
changing custody. Justice Howe noted several circumstances where strict
compliance to Hogge would in essence impede the best interests of the
7

shild.

Among his examples he specifically voiced his "concern in cases

/•here a divorce decree and custody of a child is obtained by default.
En such instances there is no determination made by the court as to
•hich parent would be superior in raising the child.11

Id.

Scott desires to be given the opportunity to present evidence which
supports his claim to custody of Jesse based on the fact that this issue
las not been fully litigated before the Court.

In the initial custody

ietermination Scott simply executed a Consent and Waiver for Entry of
"udgment and the custody award was obtained by default.

Evidence was

Lot presented to suggest that Jessef s best interests were thoroughly
xamined prior to the original award of custody nor to determine the
itness of Scott as a parent.
The application of the Hogge two-prong test was questioned recently
n Bake v. Bake, 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct.App 1989) . Neal and Vickey Bake
ere granted a divorce on August 19, 1985, and pursuant to their
tipulation the original decree awarded custody of their two sons to
eal under the provision that if the boys later decided that they would
ike

to live with their mother custody could be changed without a need

o show a change of circumstance.

The boys eventually did decide they

anted to live with their mother and she filed a petition to change
astody.

The Court granted Vickey1s petition and Neal appealed stating

lat the trial court erred in not applying the two-prong test of Hogge.
On appeal this Court referred to Maughan, supra. 7, "the scope of the

8

change-in-circumstances inquiry is less restricted when the initial
custody award was not premised on an examination of the child's best
interests,"

Id.

at 46.

The custody of the Bake children was not

examined but rather based on the parent's stipulation, and under these
circumstances the court could "accept a greater range of evidence under
Hogge's first prong regarding the initial custody arrangement, the
events that have since transpired, and the resulting effects on the
child."

Id.

Likewise, in the case at hand, Scott was not granted the

opportunity to present evidence regarding the initial decree, the events
that transpired since the initial decree, or the overall effects his
limited visitation has had on his relationship with his son.
In granting Patricia's Motion in Limine the Court stated that
evidence prior to December 14, 1984, was heard by the court in the
contempt hearing and that the presentation of any evidence in that
regard was unnecessary.
decision,

the

Court

(R. 589 at p. 4-7).
of

Appeals

has

But in contrast to this

ruled

that

when

custody

determinations are not adjudicated the res judicata policy underlying
custody is given less weight, and that the res judicata aspect of the
changed-circumstances rule "must always be subservient to the best
interests of the child. . . When a child's custody is determined by
stipulation or default, the custody determination may in fact be at odds
with the best interests of the child."
37 (Ct.App. 1989).

Elmer v. Elmer; 107 Utah Adv. Rep.

At no time during the pendency of this case in the

Fourth District Court was an impartial determination made as to the best
9

interests of the child.

For this reason Scott wishes to present all the

evidence to the Court which would support adequate findings upon which
a custody award can be based.
B.

The Findings Of The Court Should Set Forth The Facts Upon

Which The Ultimate Decision Was Based.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52 (1987) states the purpose and guidelines for
findings by the court:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the
facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon,. . .in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of
law which constitute the grounds of its action.
This Court recently addressed the issue of adequate findings in
T

ensen v. Jensen,

110 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 7 (Ct.App. 198 9) .

Raymond and LaRae

Jensen were divorced on February, 10, 1987, and Raymond was awarded
custody of the parties three minor children, as well as LaRaefs two
:hildren from a previous marriage, which Raymond had adopted.
L987 LaRae sought custody of the children.

In June

On October 15, 1987, the

lecree was amended to award custody of the two older children to LaRae
Dased on the agreement in the initial decree that the two older children
:ould elect to have custody changed.

The Court determined that there

/as not a material change of circumstance to warrant changing custody
)f the three younger children so they remained with Raymond.

The trial

:ourt failed to make findings regarding the portion of the petition
relating to the younger children, and LaRae appealed from that portion

10

of the order.
In seeking custody of her younger children LaRae relied upon the
theory of changed circumstances, but "other than an unsigned statement
by the court that Raymond is still the primary caretaker, the trial
courtfs order neither discusses LaRaefs evidence in support of her
affidavit, nor compares that evidence with the factors underlying the
original award." Id. at 28.

The initial custody award findings did not

detail the reasoning for the Court's decision; it simply concluded that
Raymond was a "proper parent to be awarded the care, custody and control
of the minor children." Id. at 29.

With only the statement of Raymond

being a proper parent there was not a means of comparing the initial
decree with LaRae's claimed change in circumstances.

The Court ruled:

Because there is simply insufficient factual grounds
expressed to conclude whether a change of
circumstances has been demonstrated, we are
compelled to remand the case to the trial court for
entry of appropriate findings.
Those findings
should articulate the considerations behind the
initial award of custody and the order denying
modification, and should reflect the current legal
standard for modification of custody.
Id. at 29.

The Court vacated the trial courtf s order denying LaRae' s

petition and remanded for entry of appropriate findings.
The importance of appropriate findings is emphasized in Smith v. Smith,
726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986):
To
ensure that the trial
court's
custody
determination, discretionary as it is, . . . is
rationally based, it is essential that the court
set forth in its findings of fact not only that it
finds one parent to be the better person to care
11

for the child, but also the basic facts which show why that ultimate
inclusion is justified . • • Proper findings of fact ensure that the
iltimate custody award follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence and the controlling legal principles• Adequate findings are
ilso necessary for this Court to perform its assigned review function.
In Smith the Supreme Court of Utah reversed and remanded the trial court's
)rder due to the fact that the written findings and statements
institute adequate findings.
findings are those that
enough

Another recent case explains: "Adequate

(1) are sufficiently detailed,

facts to disclose

did not

the process

through

which

(2) include
the

ultimate

:onclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process is logical and properly
;upported, and (4) are not clearly erroneous."
>.2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987).

Marchant v. Marchant, 743

Unless the findings meet this standard,

.he issue of custody must be reversed. Id.
A review of the findings of fact in the matter currently before
.his Court clearly shows the above standard was not met.

The Findings

f Fact and Conclusions of Law filed from the initial decree of divorce
Appendix " B " ) , stated that Patricia

(Smith) Taylor was "a fit and

roper parent and should be awarded the sole care and custody of the
inor child

of the parties," and granted Scott Smith

isitation," (R. 12-14).

"reasonable

The Findings of Fact entered by the Court on

cott's petition to modify (Appendix "C"), stated both parents were fit,
nd there was not a material change of circumstances warranting a change
f custody.

(R. 436-438).

indings" to this case:

In applying the standard for "adequate

(1) The Court failed to provide sufficient

detail, simply disclosing that both parents were fit, and that there was
12

no material change of circumstances;

(2) The findings failed to state

the basis for its determination that there was not a material change,
and did not disclose the process by which the Court reached this
decision;
supported;

(3)
(4)

There is no indication that the process is logical or
There was not enough evidence presented to the court

to determine if a change of circumstances clearly exists. The findings
having not met this standard, the issue of custody must therefore be
reversed.

Marchant, supra.

The initial award of custody, as previously stated, was not fully
litigated due to the fact that the decree and award of custody were
entered by default. There have been modifications to the initial decree
in attempts to reconcile problems associated with Scott's visitation,
but the only instance in which Scott has attempted to change custody of
Jesse is the decision from which he now appeals.

Had the trial court

heard the entire record it would have been better able to determine the
true nature of the claimed change-in-circumstances.
POINT II
INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION CONSTITUTES
A MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD
WARRANT A CHANGE IN CUSTODY
It is well established that the prime concern of the courts in any
custody matters is the welfare of the children and the standard is "the
best interest of the child."

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.

In Pusey v. Pusey,

728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated that the "best

13

.nterest" standard should be based on function-related factors, and
•ef erred to Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts,
.8 Fam.L.Q. 1 (Spring 1984), for those factors-

The Atkinson article

liscusses the interference with visitation problem specifically.
•easoning

goes

as

follows:

Simply

because

two

individuals

The
have

letermined they can no longer continue their lives together does not
tliminate a child's need to have an association with both parents.
>uring the process of obtaining a divorce where a child is involved it
s the child who suffers the greatest loss and disruption.

Upon order

• f the court one parent is awarded custody and the other is granted
isitation rights in hopes that the child will be able to continue a
ealthy relationship with both parents.
ecurity

in these

overlooked.

All

situations
too

While the child's need for

escalates, in many

often

a

child

is

instances

exposed

to

it is

parents1

houghtlessness as the child is used as parents1 avenue for expressing
nimosity

to each

•elationship.

other as they

attempt to severe their marital

For this reason, and many others, great consideration

hould be given to determining which parent will foster a frequent and
ontinuing relationship and contact between the child and the nonustodial

parent

because

of

ssociation with both parents.

the

child's

need

for that

See Atkinson at page 25.

continued

Indeed, "The

est welfare of minor children is promoted by having such children
espect and love both parents."

Thurman v. Thurman, 245 P.2d 810, 814

Idaho 1952).
14

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(2) states:
In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among
other factors the court finds relevant, which parent
is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as
the court finds appropriate. (1988)
Two benefits can be attributed to ascertaining the most giving parent:
(1) "the child has easier access to the security and love of both
parents; and" (2) "the parent who is giving is usually more emotionally
healthy and a better role model for the child."

Atkinson, supra.

A number of surrounding states have reviewed the effects of
custodial

parents

interfering with

the visitation

rights of non-

custodial parents and have determined that such actions have a direct
bearing on the best interests of the child.

Atkinson explains:

Courts with increasing frequency are changing
custody if the custodial parent is interfering with
visitation. In extreme cases in which the custodial
parent has completely thwarted or severely limited
the visitation for several months, the interference
with visitation by itself has been a sufficient
basis to modify custody."
Atkinson at p. 26.
the

issue

of

Although Utah, to this point, has not yet ruled on

visitation

interference,

several

other

states

have

determined the circumstances which may allow change of custody to occur:
New Mexicofs Lopez v. Lopez, 639 P.2d 1186, 28 ALR4th 1, (N.M. 1981),
addressed

a similar issue as the one at bar. Nancy and Dagoberto Lopez

were divorced in 1977 and the custody of their son, Cid, was awarded to
Nancy with visitation rights to Dagoberto.
)f divorce there were problems with visitation.

From the time of the decree
In February 1979, the

parties agreed to a specific visitation schedule to hopefully resolve
the problem, but problems persisted•

Cid was moved from New Mexico to

Washington D.C., then to California, and later to a different city in
sTew Mexico, all without informing Dagoberto of his whereabouts*

Upon

Locating his son Dagoberto filed for a change of custody, and Nancy was
found in contempt of Court for failure to comply with the court ordered
/isitation rights.
The trial court considered all factors of each parties relationship
tfith Cid, but their overriding consideration was Nancy's "lack of
cooperation and prior refusal to follow the trial court order concerning
/isitation." Annot., 28 ALR4th 1, 5 (1984). The trial court determined
:hat the best interests of Cid would be best served by changing custody
:o his father.

On appeal the Supreme Court of New Mexico observed that

rtien the custodial parent intentionally thwarts or frustrates the
/isitation rights of the non-custodial parent change in custody is
warranted.

The act of preventing a child from being with his father is

Inconsistent with the best interests of the child.
Marriage of Ciganovich,

Lopez, referring to

61 Cal.App.3d 289, 132 Cal.Rptr. 261 (1976); and

Zntwistle v. Entwistle, 61 App.Div.2d 380, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1978).
In its own decision (Hester v. Hester, 676 P.2d 1338 (N.M.App. 1984)),
:he Court of Appeals of New Mexico affirmed Lopez, holding: "When the
custodial parent intentionally takes action to frustrate or eliminate
the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent, a change of custody
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is an appropriate action."
The Idaho Courts have voiced a similar approval: "Modification of
custody of minor children . . • is proper where it appears that the
custodial parent has contrived to prevent the other parent from seeing
and visiting such children in the manner and spirit provided for in the
decree."

Thurman, supra. 14, at 814.

The Court of Appeals in Arizona was presented with a comparable
issue in Stapley v. Stapley, 485 P.2d 1181 (Ariz.App. 1971).
were divorced in August 1967.

The Stapley's

In December 1968, after difficulties

arose regarding visitation, the father petitioned for a modification in
custody to specify his visitation rights.

In July 1969, he again

petitioned the court, this time for a change in custody due to the
mother's refusal to comply with visitation.

The court found her in

contempt for violating the prior visitation orders and said contempt
could be purged upon strict compliance with visitation.

The problem

continued and again the father petitioned for a change in custody in
December 1969.

The trial court determined that the best interests of

the children would be best served by changing custody to the father.
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision
and stated, "Although courts should not change custody as punishment for
contempt, we believe it is not inappropriate to consider such conduct
both as a change of condition and as a factor in determining the child's
welfare."

Id.

The Arizona Court further articulated:

It was not inappropriate to consider the mother's
17

conduct which occurred between the time she was
awarded custody and the denial of the husband's
July, 1969 request for modification in order to show
changed conditions.
W.

The Stapley case relates directly to that of the case presently

Defore the Court.

Patricia Taylor was found to have made willful

attempts to interfere and thwart Scott Smith's visitation rights. Scott
nade numerous petitions to the court for modification of his visitation.
3ut even after those attempts Patricia was still found to be in contempt
Df court.

(R. 426) . As stated in Stapley, it would have been appropriate

for the lower court to have reviewed the entire record from the initial
iecree to the date of Scott's petition for change in custody.

Had the

:rial court viewed all the evidence, the material nature of visitation
Interference would have been more clearly presented to the Court and
tfould have warranted a finding that a material change of circumstances
ias occurred.
In Stapley, the Arizona Court found that the mother had not curbed
ler animosity towards the father and that she had little regard for
:ourt orders, both of which adversely reflected her suitability.

With

regards to the mother's willful defiance of the court order, the Arizona
:ourt quoted a ruling of the Supreme Court of Washington:
In assuming responsibility for the custody and care
of children of divorced parents, the courts are
entitled to expect a custodial parent to assume some
responsibility imposed by the court as to the care
of a child.
In the instant case, Mrs. Sweeny's
conduct was not solely a matter of violating a court
order or of disrespect for the court. That alone
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is a serious matter and might very well bear upon the determination of
a parent's fitness to discipline, instruct, and care for a child.
Certainly, a lack of respect for the courts, for law and order, may
quite conceivably set an example not conducive to good citizenship or
to a well-adjusted character or personality on the part of a child.
Sweeny v. Sweeny, 262 P.2d 207, 213 (Wash. 1953).

Parents are role models

for their children and when determining custody the courts "shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties."
§

30-3-10(1).

Patricia

Taylor's

conduct

has

Utah Code Ann.

demonstrated

her

willingness to violate or disrespect the orders of the court, which has
a bearing on the example she sets for the parties' minor child Jesse.
Patricia was found to be in contempt of court but was given the
opportunity to purge herself by complying with the visitation rights of
Scott.

Judge Harding expressed his concerns regarding Patricia's

unwillingness to comply with Court orders, and her actions were believed
to be a means of avoiding Utah's jurisdiction.

(R. 359).

In the

Memorandum Decision of Judge Harding filed with the Court on December
19, 1988, Patricia was still found to be in contempt of Court despite
improvements she had made.

The Judge stated that Patricia "as yet had

not purged herself of contempt due to her continued uncooperative
attitude in regards to visitation."

(R.425-27).

A parent's respect for law and order does have a bearing on that
parent's suitability

in raising a child and is a factor to which

consideration should be given in the best interests of a child. Sweeny,
upra. The Colorado and Missouri Courts are in agreement with this statement:
19

When a parent shows little or no regard for the
legitimate order of a court relating to custody,
that fact is certainly one factor for the court to
weigh in considering suitability of who shall have
custody of a child along with other facts . . .
Holland v. Holland, 373 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1962).
Interference with visitation is a factor properly
to be considered in determining the welfare of a
child for the purpose of measuring the custodial
parent's mental attitude toward law and order,' for
1
[a] person with such little regard for constituted
authority can hardly lay claim to being an ideal
person to direct the training and upbringing of a
young child.f
Garrett v. Garrett, 464 S.W.2d 740 (Mo.App. 1 9 7 1 ) .
In the case before the Court Scott Smith was granted reasonable
visitation in the divorce entered by default.

The initial decree did

not set forth with enough specificity when and where visitation would
occur and so Scott obtained a modification for the purpose of more
clearly defining his visitation with his son.

Subsequent to the

modification Patricia absconded Jesse to Mexico and failed to notify
Scott of his son's whereabouts's and denied communication and visitation
between father and son.

Upon locating his son in Mexico, Scott made

numerous attempts to exercise his visitation none to which Patricia
would agree.

Sometime later, Patricia again relocated herself and

Jesse, this time to the State of Arizona and again she failed to notify
Scott of Jesse's whereabouts. In September 1983, Scott found out that
Jesse was residing in Arizona.

(R. 468) .

On October 5, 1984, Scott

attempted to visit his son in Arizona, when he arrived he was denied
visitation by Patricia's present husband Steve Taylor.

(R. 472-73).

For a period of 37 months Scott was denied his visitation rights with
Jesse, and finally the issue of visitation came before Judge Bullock on
December 11, 1984.
On December 13, 1984, Judge Bullock reconvened with counsel (R.
571), and presented his conclusions.

Judge Bullock termed Patricia's

contempt of deliberately denying Scott's visitation as a "violation of
the spirit as well as the letter of the Order," and that she would be
held

in contempt until

visitation schedule.

she purged herself by complying with the

(R. 571-72).

Judge Bullock stated, "my intent is

not to punish her (Patricia), but simply to convince her that it's for
the benefit of everybody to cooperate in giving this kid a relationship
with his Dad."

(R. 576).

Since Judge Bullock's order Scott has been able to exercise
visitation

with

Jesse, but

the

father-son

relationship

has been

seriously thwarted by the visitation interference which occurred since
August 1981. Although there have been improvements with regards to the
accessibility

of Jesse, Scott's visitation rights have still been

thwarted, and for this reason Scott has sought a change of custody in
the best interests of his son Jesse, not merely a modification of his
visitation rights.

CONCLUSION
The Fourth Judicial District Court erred in limiting the evidence
.o be presented in support of Scott Smith's Petition to Modify the
)ecree of Divorce.

Based on the previous decisions of this Court the
21

:hange-in-circumstances requirement has a less rigid application when
seeking a modification of a default divorce.

In December 1984 Patricia

/as found to be in contempt of court for her defying court orders in
regard to visitation.

The Court allowed her the privilege of purging

lerself of said contempt by strictly adhering to the visitation rights
)f Scott Smith.

In December 1988, the Court determined that Patricia

lad not yet purged herself of contempt.

The full ramifications of

Patricia's interference with Scott's visitation rights have not been
)resented to the Court's in light of a petition to change custody.
It is in the best interest of Jesse Smith for the Court to remand
:his case to the Fourth Judicial District Court so that evidence can be
)resented relative to Patricia's interference with visitation prior to
.984. Defendant-Appellant

Scott Smith prays this court to hold the

iistrict court abused its discretion in granting a motion in limine
excluding evidence of prior visitation misconduct and remand this matter
iccordingly.
DATED this

I 7^ day of October 1989.

£Y N E B

ATSON, P.C., f
kTSON. CRIBNER & BURROWS
n
Attorney
for Defendant-Appellant
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
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Robert L. Moody
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, UT 84603
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APPENDIX A
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE - 52
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 30-3-10

30-3-9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 30-3-9 (R.S. 1898 & C.L.
1907, § 1213; C.L. 1917, § 3005; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 40-3-9), relating to the forfeiture of

marital rights by the guilty party in a divorce
proceeding, was repealed by Laws 1969, ch. 72,
§ 26.

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their
marriage is declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the
future care and custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. In
determining custody, the court shall consider the best interests of the child
and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties.
The court may inquire of the children and take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are not
controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate.
History: L. 1903, ch. 82, § 1; C.L. 1907,
§ 1212x; C.L. 1917, § 3004; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 40-3-10; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 7; 1977, ch.
122, § 5; 1988, ch. 106, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, designated the
former provisions as Subsection (1), added Sub-

section (2), and made various stylistic and
punctuation changes in Subsection (1).
Cross-References. — Disposition of property and children, § 30-3-5.
Removal of children from homestead,
§ 30-2-10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.
Application of section.
Children's choice.
Factors in determining child's best interest.
—Improper factors.
—Moral character.
Findings of foreign court.
Findings required.
Modification.
Preference for mother.
Presumption in favor of natural parents.
Retention of jurisdiction pending appeal.
Standard for determining custody.
Appeals.
In child custody determinations, the trial
court's decision should be upheld on appeal unless the trial court's action is so flagrantly
unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
A determination of the "best interests of the
child" turns on factors the trial court is best

able to assess, and only when the action taken
by the trial court is so unjust as to constitute
an abuse of discretion should the Supreme
Court substitute its own judgment. Hirsch v.
Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986).
Application of section.
Where father of an illegitimate child had
adopted such child by acknowledgment under
§ 78-30-12, and the father and mother of the
child had never married, the standards of this
section were employed in an action between
the mother and father for custody of the child.
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981),
overruled on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey,
728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
Concomitant with the rights of a legitimated
child adopted by the acknowledgement of its
father are the rights of its biological father. In
a dispute with the child's mother over visitation rights or custody, the biological father's
rights with respect to the legitimated child are
adjudicated under the divorce laws codified in
§ 30-3-5 and this section. Chandler v.
Mathews, 734 P.2d 907 (Utah 1987).

Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. -^ The 1986 amendment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preceding "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth
sentence and added the last sentence.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
—Credibility of witnesses.

—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA G. SMITH,
FINDINGS OF FACT
and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No.

56264

SCOTT G. SMITH,
Defendant,

THIS MATTER was heard before the Honorable J. Robert
Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on the 13th day
of

April,

1981.

Plaintiff

was

represented by Sherwood N. Cook.
in Court.

present

in

Court

and

Defendant was not present

The Court noted that Defendant had executed a

Consent and Waiver for Entry of Judgment which had been duly
filed with the Court.

Upon the basis of record herein and

Plaintiff's sworn testimony, the Court, being fully advised,
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of

Utah and has been for more than three (3) months immediately
prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

are

wife

and

husband,

having married on June 3, 1977, at Provo, Utah.
3.

Plaintiff

and

following minor child:

Defendant

are

parents

of

the

JESSE MALCOLM SMITH, born October 8,

1978.
4.
her

great

Defendant has treated Plaintiff cruelly, causing
mental

distress

by physically

abusing

her on

numerous

occasions

and by refusing

to allow her to have

contact with her family,
5.

The personal

property

of the parties

should be

divided as follows:
(a)
television

To

Plaintiff:

set; washer;

microwave

oven;

one dresser; dinette

bunkbeds;

set; vacuum

cleaner and all her personal belongings and effects.
(b)

To

Defendant:

couch;

waterbed;

dryer;

stereo; dresser; lawn mower and all his personal belongings
and effects.
6.

Plaintiff

should

be awarded

the 1975 Vega and

Defendant should be awarded the 1967 Camero.
assume

the obligations

associated

with

Each should

their

respective

vehicles.
7.

Plaintiff

should

not

be

awarded

any

sums

as

alimony.
8.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and should be

awarded the sole care and custody of the minor child of the
parties.
9.

Defendant

should

have

rights

of

reasonable

visitation which shall include, as a minimum, the following:
(a)

Every other weekend.

(b)

One evening during the week that he does not

visit on the weekend.
(c)
10.

Every other holdiay.

Defendant

should be ordered

the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE

to pay to Plaintiff
($125.00) DOLLARS per

month for the support and maintenance of the minor child of
the parties until said child should die, marry or reach the
age of majority, whichever should first occur.
11.

The debts of the parties should be allocated as

follows:
(a)

Plaintiff

should

pay,

and

hold

Defendant

harmless therefrom, the loan from Alpine Credit Union.
(b)

Defendant

should

payf

and

hold

Plaintiff

harmless therefrom, the loan from UP&L Credit Union.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiff
containing

should

orders

be

awarded

consistent

with

a

Decree

the above

of

Divorce

Findings of

Fact, to become final three (3) months from date of entry.
DATED this

13

day of April, A.D., Jrffll?

r'

I

'JTA.iUUN: T.ST.Vf

Sherwood N. Cook
PARKER, McKEOWN, McCONKIE & HILL
University Mall - Mez. #210
Oremf Utah 84057
Telephone: 226-2030
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA G, SMITH,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

v.
MZivil No, 56264
SCOTT G. SMITH,

]
Defendant,

THIS MATTER

was heard before the Honorable J. Robert

Bullock, Judge of the above-entitled Court, on the 13th day
of

April,

1981.

Plaintiff

was

present

in

Court

and

represented by Sherwood N. Cook of PARKER, McKEOWN, McCONKIE
& HILL,

Defendant

was not present

in Court,

The Court

noted that Defendant had executed a Consent and Waiver for
Entry of Judgment which had been duly filed with the Court,
Upon

the

basis

testimony,

and

of

record

pursuant

herein
to

the

and

Plaintiff's

Findings

of

sworn

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law made in this matter;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1,

Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce to become

final three months from date of entry.
2.

The personal

property

of the parties

is hereby

awarded as follows:
(a)
television

To

Plaintiff:

set; washer;

microwave

oven;

one dresser; dinette

bunkbeds;

set; vacuum

cleaner and all her personal belongings and effects.
(b)

To

Defendant:

stereo; dresser; lawn mower and
and effects.

?

couch;

waterbed;

dryer;

all his personal belongings

nrpi'i

3.

Plaintiff

Defendant
assume

is hereby

is hereby

awarded

the obligations

awarded

the 1975 Vega and

the 1967 Camero.

associated

with

their

Each shall
respective

vehicles.
4.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded no sums as alimony.

5.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper parent and is hereby

awarded the sole care and custody of the minor child of the
parties.
6.

Defendant

shall

have

rights

of

reasonable

visitation which shall include, as a minimumf the following:
(a)

Every other weekend.

(b)

One evening during the week that he does not

visit on the weekend.
(c)
7.

Every other holiday.

Defendant

is hereby

ordered

the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE

to pay to Plaintiff
($125.00) DOLLARS per

month for the support and maintenance of the minor child of
the parties until said child shall die f marry or reach the
age of majority r whichever shall first occur.
8.

The debts of the parties are hereby allocated as

follows:
(a)

Plaintiff

shall

pay,

and

hold

Defendant

harmless therefrom, the loan from Alpine Credit Union.
(b)

Defendant

shall

pay,

and

hold

Plaintiff

harmless therefrom, the loan from UP&L Credit Union.

APPENDIX C
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER
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Robert L. Moody, #2302

TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2525 N. Canyon Road
P.O. Box 1466
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA G. SMITH (TAYLOR),

Plaintiff,

:

:

vs.

:

SCOTT G. SMITH,

:

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER

Case No. 56,264
Judge: Ray Harding

:

The above entitled matter having come on regularly for
hearing before the Court on the 13th day of December, 1988, and
the Court having heard evidence and having taken the matter under
advisement

and having made in writing

its Memorandum

Decision,

now enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that both parents are fit.

2.

The Court finds that there has not been a showing

of a material change of circumstance.
3.

The

Court

finds

that

although

the

Plaintiff's

conduct has improved since she was found to be in contempt of
- 1 -

Court, such improvement has not been sufficient to purge herself
and the Court should continue its jurisdiction.

Defendant

4.

The

Court

and

interest

finds

pursuant

that

the

funds

to the previous

held

by

the

Order

of

the

Court should be paid over to the Plaintiff forthwith.
The Court having made in writing its Findings of Fact
now enters the following:

ORDER
1.

It is hereby ordered that Defendant's Petition to

Modify the Decree of Divorce is hereby dismissed.
2.
ordered paid

Defendant

is ordered

to the Plaintiff

forthwith

to pay

the

sums

in the Court's Order of June 2,

1986, and Defendant's subsequent Motion with regard to said Order
is hereby denied.
3.

Each

of

the

parties

is

hereby

ordered

to

be

cooperative with the other and the parties are further

ordered

not

in

to

make

any

disparaging

presence of the minor

remarks

child of

about

the

the parties or

which said minor child will be effected.

other

the

in a manner

in

The parties are further

ordered to encourage love and respect to enable the minor child
of

the parties

to have a happy

loving

relationship with

each

parent without regard to which one he resides with.
4.

The Court hereby orders each of the parties to bear

their own attorney's fees and costs.
- 2 -

DATED this^£* day of y j ^ S M ^ ^

, 198$.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WAYNE B. WATSON
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER was
mailed to Wayne B. Watson, Attorney for Defendant, 2696 North
University Ave., Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604; postage prepaid
this

<£$" day of OTcom&r, 198i.
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